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Abstract
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where
people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way cap-
tured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a ﬁnal
collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the
six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experi-
ment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies
and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the
most frequently chosen ranking is the socially eﬃcient one. Second,
subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of
individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.
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Voters often are not only interested in who is ranked highest, but also in
the entire collective ranking of candidates. Examples are university hiring
committees and tournaments in sports. To introduce the speciﬁc scenario
that we shall analyze, think of three individuals (the voters) who will attend
the performance of three musicians (the candidates or alternatives). The
performance is a collective good from which all voters will beneﬁt. The three
voters disagree about the value of the musicians in the way captured by the
well-known Condorcet’s voting paradox. Nonetheless, they must agree on a
collective ranking which establishes how long each musician will perform in
the show that the voters will attend.
More generally, we have in mind any situation where a collectivity has to
settle for a common ranking of alternatives which are evaluated diﬀerently
by diﬀerent members and in such a way that collective preferences are cyclic
(i.e., not transitive), even if individual preferences are not. The alternatives
are open to a variety of interpretations. For example, they can be thought of
as diﬀerent waste disposal methods (e.g., incineration, recycling, landﬁll) or
as diﬀerent energy production technologies (e.g., nuclear, fossil fuels, renew-
able). The ranking of the alternatives would then be the relative importance
given to each method/technology within the waste/energy management plan.
While in the traditional literature collectivity members are required to
cast votes for the several alternatives in order to obtain a ﬁnal collective
ranking (see, e.g., Kelly 1974a, 1974b; for more recent work see Brams et al.,
2008, and references therein), we allow each member to bid for each feasible
ranking. Bids express how much a member is willing to pay for implementing
a certain ranking. By reporting such a bid vector, each collectivity member
can inﬂuence which ranking is chosen. Our idea, here, is that as there is a
value that each member places on the selected ranking, he should pay some
money in order to implement it. On the one hand, this is reminiscent of how
private goods are allocated by markets. On the other hand, letting every-
one pay for the selected ranking (besides solving the paradox endogenously)
may help contain potential ineﬃciencies arising from the “resource-wasting
2
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The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to derive axiomatically a procedu-
rally fair bidding rule for determining the selected ranking and the resulting
individual payments. In our setting, fairness is a property of the selection
mechanism (or game form), not of the selected ranking. Our procedurally
fair mechanism guarantees indeed that all parties are treated equally accord-
ing to an objective criterion (namely their bids) even if, ex post, the selected
ranking is not valued equally by all collectivity members. In this respect,
our approach diﬀers from previous models that deﬁne fairness with respect
to ﬁnal outcomes (so-called allocative fairness).2 Additionally, we are inter-
ested in legal or constitutional mechanisms where fairness is deﬁned in terms
of observables rather than in terms of idiosyncratic (and usually privately
known) characteristics such as the bidders’ true valuations of all rankings.
The second objective of our paper is to explore, via an experiment,
whether and how the selected ranking and the bidding behavior are aﬀected
by changes in some features of the bidding contest whose game form is pro-
cedurally fair. Obviously, this requires a proper bidding game which can be
implemented in the laboratory.3 We consider a simple game with three alter-
natives and three individuals. As in the introductory examples above, each
ranking of the three alternatives can be viewed as a collective good: none
of the three individuals is excluded from enjoying the selected ranking, even
though each distinct individual may assign a diﬀerent value to it. Assuming
cardinal utilities for each alternative (G¨ uth and Selten, 1991), we obtain the
individual true valuations of each ranking by weighting and summing up the
utilities associated with the three alternatives. Additionally, we suppose that
the true valuations are common knowledge.4 The sum of individual true val-
1This term is used by Buchanan (1983) in relation to noncompensated transfers and
the emergence of rent-seeking behavior.
2A recent work highlighting the distinction between procedural and allocative fairness
is by Chassang and Zehnder (2011).
3Most of the experimental literature on the voting paradox has tested whether people
vote sincerely or strategically, and focused on the eﬀect of information about the distri-
bution of preferences on voting strategies (see, e.g., Tyszler and Schram, 2011; for an
overview of experimental results see Palfrey, 2009).
4It may be argued that much of the social choice literature is concerned with situations
where people have incomplete information about others’ utilities. However, the Condorcet
3
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of three individuals) derives from that ranking.
The proper game features the three individuals as heterogeneous with re-
spect to the (cardinal) utility they derive from the alternatives. This implies
that the feasible rankings diﬀer in the level of social welfare they generate,
allowing us to study the eﬀects of procedural fairness in situations where col-
lective preferences are cyclic and the feasible rankings can be ordered with
respect to their social welfare.
The key design feature of our experiment is that we vary the sum of
individual payments associated to the selected ranking, keeping the game
form procedurally fair. In one treatment individual payments add up to
zero. In another they add up to a positive amount, resembling a situation
in which the three individuals pay a “tax” for bringing about the selected
ranking. Finally, there is a treatment where individual payments add up
to a negative amount, corresponding to a situation in which the individuals
receive a “subsidy” for implementing the selected ranking. Through these
treatments, we can examine whether (and if so how) variations in the required
payments impinge on the selected ranking and the bidders’ stated preferences
for the six possible rankings.
We observe slightly more overbidding (i.e., bids above the true value) in
the treatment with the subsidy than in the other two. Yet, we ﬁnd that the
introduction of a tax or a subsidy does not aﬀect the relative frequencies of
selected rankings: in all three treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking
is the one generating the highest social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
axiomatic characterization of the procedurally fair bidding rule. Section 3
deﬁnes the experimentally implemented proper game. In Section 4 we de-
scribe the experimental protocol, and in Section 5 we present the ﬁndings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
paradox is viewed as a phenomenon arising from cyclic collective preferences, and not as a
problem of incomplete information. Additionally, the assumption of complete information
may not be too unrealistic if collectivity members know each other well.
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Let N = {1,...,n}, with n ≥ 2, be a group of evaluators/bidders i =
1,...,n, facing a ﬁnite set A = {A1,A2,...,Am} of m (≥ 2) alternatives.
Denote by σ a linear ranking of the m alternatives, such as A1  A2  ... 
Am, and by Σ the set of all linear rankings of A (we shall write “(A1,A2,...)”
for rankings). Thus the rankings correspond to all possible permutations of
A and the set Σ contains m! elements. A superscript index in parentheses
will be sometimes used to refer to a speciﬁc permutation; for example, the
notation σ(r), with (r) = 1,2,3,...,|Σ|, will indicate any permutation of the
alternatives to which we assign the rth position in the rankings sequence.
As explained in the Introduction, each evaluator i ∈ N speciﬁes a mon-
etary bid bi(σ) for each σ ∈ Σ, i.e., he reports how much each ranking is
worth to him. Hence each i submits a bid vector bi = (bi(σ) ∈ R : σ ∈ Σ).
The bid vectors of all n evaluators result in a bid proﬁle b = (b1,...,bn).
For each proﬁle b, a bidding rule must specify, ﬁrst, which collective rank-
ing is selected, and, second, which amount should be paid by each evaluator.
To uniquely derive such a rule, we impose three ethical or procedural fairness
requirements.5 Note that the analysis is in objective terms, namely in mon-
etary bids. Nothing is said about the subjective perceptions and valuations
of the rankings. The reason is that we want to stay in the tradition of legal
or constitutional mechanisms, which deal with game forms (constitutions)
and deﬁne fairness by observables rather than by idiosyncratic true values.
Hence, we deﬁne fairness with respect to bids and derive the procedurally
fair bidding rule from the following three axioms.
(O) “Optimality with respect to bids” means that the selected collective








i.e., the selected ranking attains the maximal sum of bids.
5See G¨ uth and Kliemt (2011) for a more elaborate discussion of these requirements.
5
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 005(C) “Cost balancing” requires that the individual payments, denoted by





(E) “Equal net beneﬁts with respect to bids” aﬃrms that if σ∗ ∈ Σ is
selected, then
bi(σ
∗) − ci (σ
∗,b) = bj(σ
∗) − cj (σ
∗,b) ∀i,j, and b.
Due to axiom (E), we can write
bi(σ
∗) − ci (σ
∗,b) = ∆ ∀i ∈ N. (1)













∗) = n∆ + K.
Substituting ∆ into Eq. (1), we obtain
ci (σ
∗,b) = bi(σ
∗) − ∆ = bi(σ
∗) −
Pn
j=1 bj(σ∗) − K
n
(2)
for all i ∈ N. Hence, the procedurally fair rule for collectively ranking
alternatives selects the ranking with the highest sum of bids, and imposes
the payment given in (2) on each bidder. Note that if the sum of bids for
the selected ranking is at least K, nobody has to pay more than his bid.
We have so far derived a game form. In the next section we describe the
experimentally implemented proper game. As mentioned in the Introduction,
6
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3 The experimental bidding game
There are three bidders, N = {1,2,3}, and three alternatives, A = {A,B,C}.
Each bidder i has a true preference ordering (denoted by i) over the alter-
natives. Without loss of generality, a bidder’s utilities for his least and most
preferred alternatives can be normalized to 0 and 1, respectively. We use the
symbol mi for player i’s utility of his second most preferred (midle) alterna-
tive with mi ∈ (0,1) for i = 1,2,3. To obtain the voting paradox, we assume
the following true individual preference orderings of the alternatives:
B 1 A 1 C, C 2 B 2 A, A 3 C 3 B. (3)
Thus, for instance, bidder 2 prefers C to B, B to A, and (because of tran-
sitivity) C to A. Since A {1,3} C (to be read: “the majority composed by
1 and 3 prefers A to C”), C {2,3} B but B {1,2} A, no majority ranking
emerges; instead, we have a cycle.
Given our utility speciﬁcation and the preference orderings shown in (3),
the cardinal utilities attached to each alternative by the three bidders are
u1(B) = 1, u1(A) = m1, u1(C) = 0;
u2(C) = 1, u2(B) = m2, u2(A) = 0;
u3(A) = 1, u3(C) = m3, u3(B) = 0.
There are six possible rankings of the three alternatives:
σ
(1) = (A,B,C), σ(2) = (A,C,B), σ
(3) = (B,A,C),
σ
(4) = (B,C,A), σ(5) = (C,A,B), σ
(6) = (C,B,A).6
Each bidder i = 1,2,3 must therefore submit a bid vector bi containing six
bids, one bid for each of the above rankings. The combined bid vector of all
6The rankings denoted by σ(3), σ(6), and σ(2) reﬂect the true preference orderings of,
respectively, bidders 1, 2, and 3 (see (3)).
7
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r = 1,2,...,6)


























































bidders b = (b1,b2,b3) determines the selected collective ranking, σ∗, and
the payments of the three bidders according to the bidding rule presented
in the previous section. If two or more rankings tie for ﬁrst place (i.e., they
receive the same maximal bid sum), the tie is broken by selecting the ranking
that generates the highest social welfare.7 The resulting monetary payoﬀ of





j=1 bj(σ∗) − K
3
(4)
where Ui(σ∗) is bidder i’s true valuation of the selected ranking.
To derive Ui(σ(r)) from the cardinal utilities that i attaches to each al-
ternative, we consider the weighted sum of the utilities where the weights
depend on the relative position of the alternative in the ranking. More
speciﬁcally, given a generic ranking σ(r) ∈ Σ, we weight the utility for the








3 . In the same way one can determine the individual true
valuations of all rankings in Σ (see Table 1).







(r)) for r = 1,2,...,5,6.
7This tie-breaking rule is not required by our axioms, but used only for facilitating the
experimental procedures.
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the social welfare generated by each feasible ranking varies. Speciﬁcally, the
larger the diﬀerence between mi and mj, the larger the diﬀerence in social
welfare across rankings.
Assuming that the true valuations are commonly known, we have a well-
deﬁned game with strategies bi and payoﬀs πi(b) speciﬁed in Eq. (4). This
game has an abundance of pure strategy equilibria (the derivation of one
such equilibria is given in Appendix A).
4 The experimental design
4.1 Treatments
One of our main goals is to determine whether and to what extent bidding
behavior under our procedurally fair rule is aﬀected by variations in the re-
quired total payments. To this end, we distinguish three treatments diﬀering
only in the value assumed by K in payoﬀ function (4).
• In one treatment we ﬁx K = 0. In this case, each bidder’s payment
(i.e., his own bid) is reduced by 1/3 of the sum of bids for the selected
ranking.
• In another treatment we ﬁx K > 0. In this case, each bidder’s payment
is reduced by less than 1/3 of the sum of bids, resembling a situation
in which the bidders have to pay a tax for bringing about the selected
ranking. We refer to this treatment as the T treatment (for “taxation”).
• In a third treatment, we ﬁx K < 0. In this case, each bidder’s payment
is reduced by more than 1/3 of the sum of bids. This resembles a
situation in which the bidders receive a “subsidy” for implementing the
ranking. We refer to this treatment as the S treatment (for “subsidy”).
The treatment with K = 0 is used as baseline (B) treatment, whereas
treatments T (with K > 0) and S (with K < 0) allow checking how behavior
is aﬀected by the introduction of, respectively, a tax and a subsidy. We expect
more underbidding and less overbidding in treatment T than in treatment
9
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game with (m1,m2,m3) = (0.4,0.5,0.6)
Bidders σ(1) σ(2) σ(3) σ(4) σ(5) σ(6)
1 (low-utility) 533 367 633 567 300 400
2 (interm.-utility) 333 417 417 583 583 667
3 (high-utility) 600 700 433 367 633 467
W(σ(r)) 1466 1484 1483 1517 1516 1534
I(σ(r)) 138.78 179.76 120.57 120.57 179.76 138.78
B. The rationale behind this is that bidders face an additional cost (of K/3)
for each of the rankings. We expect the opposite to happen in treatment S
(namely less underbidding and more overbidding relative to B) as bidders
receive a kind of subsidy.
4.2 Experimental parameters
We wanted the basic game to be non-degenerate so that concerns for social
welfare or eﬃciency (deﬁned as the sum of the bidders’ true valuations of
a ranking) and for equality (deﬁned as the dispersion of the bidders’ true
valuations within a ranking) might play a role in the bidders’ decisions.8
At the same time, however, we wanted to have the “fairest” possible non-
degenerate proper game (in the sense of not favoring extremely one player
over the other). Thus, we set m1 = 0.4, m2 = 0.5, and m3 = 0.6. Bidder 1 is,
therefore, the low-utility bidder; bidder 2 is the intermediate-utility bidder;
and bidder 3 is the high-utility bidder.
The resulting individual true valuations of the six rankings and the cor-
responding welfare levels are reported in Table 2, together with the standard
deviations of the valuations (which we take as a measure of the inequality
8If m1 = m2 = m3, bidders would only diﬀer in their true preference orderings of
the alternatives, whereas the welfare attainable under the six rankings as well as the
inequalities among the individuals generated by each ranking would stay constant.
10
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obtained from Table 1 multiplying each entry by 1000. The socially eﬃcient
ranking is σ(6), whereas there are two rankings minimizing inequality among
bidders: σ(3) and σ(4). Yet, σ(4) guarantees a higher social welfare than σ(3).
The valuations and the bids were expressed in terms of ECU (Experimen-
tal Currency Unit), with 100 ECU = e1. Bids could be any integer number
between 0 and 1000 ECU. The parameter K was 150 ECU, implying that
in treatment T (S) each bidder paid his bid for the selected ranking and
received one third of the sum of the group’s bids minus (plus) 150.
4.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). The subjects were undergraduates students from
the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena. Considering the complexity of the
experimental procedures, only students with relatively high analytical skills
were invited, i.e., students majoring in subjects such as mathematics, physics,
engineering, economics, and business administration. They were recruited us-
ing the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Once entering the laboratory, the
participants were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals.
The three treatments were run one-shot in a within-subject design, i.e.,
participants played each treatment exactly once within a given session.9 At
the beginning of each session, each participant was randomly assigned one
of three roles: bidder 1 (the low-utility bidder with m1 = 0.4), bidder 2
(the intermediate-utility bidder with m2 = 0.5), or bidder 3 (the high-utility
bidder with m3 = 0.6).10 The role was retained throughout the session. We
implemented a “perfect stranger” protocol, which ensures that nobody meets
the same person in more than one treatment.
9One-shot games eliminate the possibility of strategic behavior that may exist in early
periods of ﬁnitely repeated games.
10Since we numbered the rankings for which participants had to bid from 1 to 6, in
the instructions we preferred to refer to the three group members as X, Y , and Z (rather
than 1, 2, and 3).
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of the experiment. Instructions (reproduced in Appendix B) were distributed
and read aloud in each of the three parts, and participants had the chance
to go through a series of control questions and four (two) practice periods
in the ﬁrst (second and third) treatment.11 Once the experimenter ensured
that everyone understood the game, the corresponding treatment started and
subjects submitted their bid vector. Only after all participants made their
decisions in one treatment, they received the instructions for the following
treatment.
Participants were informed about each bidder’s true valuations of the
rankings by a table similar to Table 2. They could sort the six rankings
according to several attributes (namely each of the three bidders’ true valu-
ations; minimum, maximum, average valuations; sum of valuations). Addi-
tionally, participants were equipped with a proﬁt calculator to simulate the
earnings of each group member in diﬀerent scenarios.
To minimize path dependence (i.e., dependence of current bids on pre-
vious outcomes), subjects did not receive any feedback until the end of the
session. At the end of the session, one treatment was chosen randomly and
subjects were paid according to their decisions in that treatment. Subjects
knew about these procedures in advance.
Instead of considering all possible permutations of our treatments, we
concentrate on treatment sequences where the baseline treatment is played
at the very beginning. We wanted the participants to interact in the sim-
plest scenario before adding taxes and subsidies. We will refer to the two
implemented sequences as BTS and BST.
We ran two sessions per sequence. Each session involved 30 participants,
matched in groups of three. With the bidders’ roles remaining constant
throughout a session, we had 20 players of each type (low-, intermediate-,
and high-utility) for each treatment in any sequence. Sessions lasted about 2
hours. Each session was composed of two independent parts. The ﬁrst part
11The practice periods did not involve any interaction (the others’ decisions were se-
lected randomly by the computer). Their sole aim was to familiarize participants with the
game and its incentives (no payments were associated with them).
12
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which was completely unrelated to bidding. Average earnings in the ﬁrst part
of the experiment were e9.60 (inclusive of a e5.50 show-up fee), ranging from
a minimum of e6 to to a maximum of e14.40.
5 Results
First, we evaluate the data at the aggregate level by examining (i) how often
each ranking is collectively selected in each treatment and (ii) the average
bidding behavior. Then, we analyze individual data so as to ﬁnd regularities
in the submitted bid vectors. Given the focus of the paper, we will be primar-
ily interested in the ordinal aspects of submitted bids, i.e., in the bidders’
stated orderings of the rankings, rather than in the cardinal and absolute
bid levels. This implies that we will neither report statistics of bid levels nor
compare treatments with respect to the players’ bids.
5.1 The selected ranking
Let us ﬁrst check for the presence of order eﬀects, i.e., investigate whether
the frequency of selection of a ranking in a certain treatment varies across
the two treatment sequences that we consider. In both sequences, the ﬁrst
treatment that subjects played was the baseline B. If recruitment was unbi-
ased, we should observe no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distribution of rank-
ings selected in B between the two sequences. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
indicates that this is indeed the case (p-value=0.739).12 We can therefore
conclude that randomization worked (i.e., the participants were suﬃciently
similar). Running the same test for the other two treatments reveals that
the distributions of selected rankings in both T and S are not aﬀected by the
order in which the treatments are played (p-value = 0.739 for T; p-value =
1.000 for S). Thus, in analyzing how often each ranking is selected, we can
pool the data from the BTS and BST sequences, which gives us a total of 40
groups for each treatment.
12Unless otherwise stated all statistical tests are two-sided.
13
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 005Table 3: Percentage of groups selecting each ranking in the three treatments.
Treatment σ(1) σ(2) σ(3) σ(4) σ(5) σ(6)
B (baseline) 10.0% 17.5% 15.0% 27.5% 2.5% 27.5%
S (subsidy) 10.0% 7.5% 17.5% 22.5% 17.5% 25.0%
T (taxation) 7.5% 17.5% 17.5% 17.5% 15.0% 25.0%


















Figure 1: Histograms of the selected rankings. Rankings are ordered on the
horizontal axes from σ(1) to σ(6).
Table 3 and Figure 1 illustrate how often each ranking attains the highest
sum of group bids separately for each treatment.13 In the baseline treatment,
rankings σ(4) and σ(6) have the highest relative frequency (27.5%). They rep-
resent, respectively, the ranking that minimizes inequality among the group
members and the socially eﬃcient ranking. In both the other treatments,
σ(6) is chosen relatively more often than all the other rankings (by 25% of
13Only in few instances is a ranking selected because of the tie-breaking rule. More
speciﬁcally, in B the rule is applied to 2 groups out of 40 (in both cases σ(6) is selected);
in S it is applied to 3 groups out of 40 (the favored rankings are σ(5), σ(3), and σ(6)); in
T it is applied to 4 groups out of 40 (favoring σ(6) three times and σ(2) once).
14
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is σ(4) in treatment S (22.5%), whereas the distribution appears to be ﬂat-
ter in treatment T. On the basis of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (accounting
for dependence of observations within groups across treatments), we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of selected rankings in the
three treatments are identical (p-value=0.713 for B vs S as well as for B vs
T; p-value=0.727 for S vs T).
For testing the robustness of our results, we constructed a larger dataset
by randomly matching our 120 participants in three-person groups for 100/
1,000/10,000/100,000 times. In this way, we generated 4,000/40,000/400,000
and 4,000,000 groups for each treatment. Using the bid vector submitted
by each player in each treatment, we obtained the ranking selected by each
randomly generated group.
The results of these simulations are given in Table 4. They are consistent
with those observed with the actual data: in all four simulations and in all
three treatments, the ranking selected with the highest frequency is σ(6). In
treatments B and T the second most frequently chosen ranking is σ(4) (what-
ever the simulated sample size), whereas in treatment S σ(3) is slightly more
common than σ(4). From this evidence we conclude that our procedurally fair
bidding rule is robust to the introduction of taxes and subsidies: even with
simulated data, the frequency in which a ranking is collectively selected does
not vary with the treatments. In particular, the socially eﬃcient ranking
remains the most often chosen ranking.
5.2 Average bidding behavior
In this section we present results on the average bidding behavior across
treatments focusing on underbidding, overbidding, and truthful bidding. Our
analysis will consider the occurrence (rather than the magnitude) of each
speciﬁc behavior.
We proceed in two steps. First, for each of the six bids bi(σ(r)), with
r = 1,2,...,6, submitted by each subject in each treatment, we create
three dummies. Each dummy corresponds to a speciﬁc bidding behavior:
15
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three treatments.
Treatment σ(1) σ(2) σ(3) σ(4) σ(5) σ(6)
4,000 groups
B (baseline) 10.5% 10.1% 20.4% 21.8% 11.6% 25.6%
S (subsidy) 9.4% 10.0% 20.8% 20.0% 11.5% 28.3%
T (taxation) 8.3% 17.5% 17.3% 20.4% 13.6% 22.9%
40,000 groups
B (baseline) 10.3% 9.3% 19.4% 22.2% 13.3% 25.5%
S (subsidy) 9.1% 10.9% 21.0% 19.9% 11.4% 27.7%
T (taxation) 7.7% 18.0% 17.1% 20.1% 13.4% 23.8%
400,000 groups
B (baseline) 10.3% 9.3% 19.5% 22.4% 13.0% 25.5%
S (subsidy) 9.1% 11.0% 20.8% 20.2% 11.1% 27.7%
T (taxation) 7.8% 17.7% 17.2% 20.0% 13.7% 23.6%
4,000,000 groups
B (baseline) 10.3% 9.4% 19.5% 22.3% 12.9% 25.5%
S (subsidy) 9.1% 10.9% 20.8% 20.2% 11.2% 27.7%
T (taxation) 7.8% 17.7% 17.3% 20.0% 13.7% 23.6%
un(derbidding), ov(erbidding), and tr(uthful bidding). Therefore, for each
individual bid
• underbidding is captured by the dummy uni(σ(r)) which takes value 1
if bi(σ(r)) < Ui(σ(r)) and 0 otherwise;
• overbidding is captured by the dummy ovi(σ(r)) which takes value 1 if
bi(σ(r)) > Ui(σ(r)) and 0 otherwise;
• truthful bidding is captured by the dummy tri(σ(r)) which takes value
16
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Once we have coded (as 0 or 1) each individual bid, we proceed to the
second step. For each subject we construct three new variables, counting
how often each of the above dummies equals 1. Thus, the number of times
in which the six individual components of a bid vector are below, above, and














In each treatment and for each bidder, UNi, OVi and TRi take values
from 0 to 6, depending on how many times underbidding, overbidding and
truthful bidding is observed in the submitted bid vector. Considering the
distribution of each of these variables over our 120 participants, we gain
an idea of the relevance of underbidding, overbidding, and truthful bidding
within a given treatment.
Before presenting our results and in analogy with the analysis of the previ-
ous section, we test for the presence of order eﬀects. This test checks whether
the relevance of a given bidding behavior within a given treatment varies with
the considered sequence. According to a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests,
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distribution of occurrences of under-
bidding, overbidding, and truthful bidding in the BST and the BTS sequences
for both treatment S (all p-values are greater than 0.586) and treatment T
(all p-values exceed 0.998).14 On the basis of these ﬁndings, we pool the data
on UNi, OVi, and TRi from the two sequences.
Table 5 reports, for each treatment, the distribution of the occurrences
of underbidding, overbidding and truthful bidding. The table shows that
underbidding is the most common behavior: in each treatment about 90%
of the participants underbid for all six rankings. Truthful bidding as well as
overbidding are observed less often. By means of a set of Wilcoxon signed-
14We compared as well the three distributions of interest in the B treatment across the
two sequences with the aim of ﬁnding out whether recruitment was unbiased also under
this respect. The p-value of all three tests equals 1.00, conﬁrming that the participants
were suﬃciently similar.
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each treatment.
Treatment 0/6 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6 5/6 6/6
underbidding
B 1.67% 0.83% 0.83% 3.33% 0.83% 1.67% 90.83%
S 1.67% 1.67% 0.83% 3.33% 1.67% 2.50% 88.33%
T 1.67% 0.83% 0% 4.17% 1.67% 0.83% 90.33%
overbidding
B 95.83% 0.83% 0.83% 1.67% 0.83% 0% 0%
S 92.50% 0.83% 0.83% 2.50% 0.83% 1.67% 0.83%
T 95.00% 0% 2.50% 0.83% 0.83% 0% 0.83%
truthful bidding
B 93.33% 1.67% 1.67% 1.67% 0% 0% 1.67%
S 95.83% 1.67% 0.83% 0.83% 0% 0% 0.83%
T 93.33% 3.33% 0.83% 1.67% 10% 0% 0.83%
Note: 120 observations per treatment.
ranks tests we can compare each given behavior across treatments. We begin
with underbidding. Contrary to our expectations of more (less) underbidding
in T (S) relative to B, we do not observe any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
occurrences of underbidding between B and S (p-value = 0.202) as well as
between B and T (p-value = 0.995). A signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerges only
when comparing the distribution of underbidding in S and T (p-value =
0.038).
Focus now on overbidding. Although this behavior is not the most com-
mon, we observe the expected signiﬁcant diﬀerences: the test is slightly above
(i) the conventional 5% level when we compare the distribution of overbidding
in B and S (p-value = 0.055); (ii) the 1% level when we compare the distri-
bution of overbidding in S and T (p-value= 0.012). No signiﬁcant diﬀerence
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Finally, considering truthful bidding we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
distributions between treatments (B vs S: p-value = 0.155; B vs T: p-value
= 0.985; S vs T: p-value = 0.178).
5.3 Behavioral regularities
In this section we analyze the individual bid vectors in order to identify
possible behavioral patterns in the bidders’ stated orderings of the rankings.
Such an analysis will shed light on i) how our procedurally fair bidding rule
translates into actual behavior, and ii) whether the introduction of a tax or
a subsidy causes a change in stated orderings.
We begin by checking whether and to what extent subjects submit bid
vectors which reﬂect their true preference ordering of the rankings. From
Table 2, this implies that
• low-utility bidder 1 should submit a bid vector b1 such that
b1(σ(3)) > b1(σ(4)) > b1(σ(1)) > b1(σ(6)) > b1(σ(2)) > b1(σ(5));
• intermediate-utility bidder 2 should submit a bid vector b2 such that
b2(σ(6)) > b2(σ(5)) = b2(σ(4)) > b2(σ(3)) = b2(σ(2)) > b2(σ(1));
• high-utility bidder 3 should submit a bid vector b3 such that
b3(σ(2)) > b3(σ(5)) > b3(σ(1)) > b3(σ(6)) > b3(σ(3)) > b3(σ(4)).
Only a few bid vectors conform to these patterns (see Table 6), and they are
mainly submitted by the high-utility bidders 3 in treatment T (25%).
A further ordering of the rankings which may capture actual bidding
behavior involves (i) preserving strict monotonicity between the most and
the second most truly preferred ranking, and (ii) requiring weak monotonicity
between the other rankings. This criterion implies that
• low-utility bidder 1 should submit a bid vector b1 such that
b1(σ(3)) > b1(σ(4)) ≥ b1(σ(1)) ≥ b1(σ(6)) ≥ b1(σ(2)) ≥ b1(σ(5));
• intermediate-utility bidder 2 should submit a bid vector b2 such that
b2(σ(6)) > b2(σ(5)) = b2(σ(4)) ≥ b2(σ(3)) = b2(σ(2)) ≥ b2(σ(1));
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their true preference ordering of the rankings. The last column
reports the percentage of consistent bidders who submit vectors in
line with their true preference ordering in all treatments.
Bidders
Treatments Over all
B S T treatments
1 (low-utility) 7.5% 10.0% 7.5% 2.5%
2 (interm.-utility) 17.5% 17.5% 7.5% 10.0%
3 (high-utility) 15.0% 15.0% 25.0% 10.0%
ALL 13.33% 14.17% 13.33% 4.17%
Note: 40 observations per treatment (10 subjects × 4 sessions);
120 observations over all treatments/bidder types.
Bottom right number: overall percentage of consistent subjects.
• high-utility bidder 3 should submit a bid vector b3 such that
b3(σ(2)) > b3(σ(5)) ≥ b3(σ(1)) ≥ b3(σ(6)) ≥ b3(σ(3)) ≥ b3(σ(4)).
We name this criterion “weak ordering” and regard the bid vectors complying
with it as showing selﬁshness.
Averaging over all treatments and player types, this criterion is able to
accommodate 49.7% (179/360) of the submitted bid vectors. Table 7 shows
the experimentally observed frequencies of “weak ordering” per player type
and treatment as well as over all players and treatments. There are a couple
of observations which are immediate from inspecting the table: (1) in each
treatment, the low-utility bidders are those who most often comply with the
criterion (especially when a subsidy is introduced), whereas the high-utility
bidders are those who least often abide by it (especially in the baseline);
(2) the high-utility bidders appear to be the most consistent type as 35% of
them submit a selﬁsh bid vector in all three treatments (vs 27.5% of both
low- and intermediate-utility bidders).15
15If we relax the strong monotonicity between the ﬁrst two preferred rankings, and
check how often bidders state a bid vector whose component bids weakly monotonically
decrease with decreasing true preferences over the rankings, we ﬁnd that 68.06% (245/360)
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weak ordering of the rankings. The last column reports the per-
centage of consistent bidders who submit vectors in line with the
weak ordering criterion in all treatments.
Bidders
Treatments Over all
B S T treatments
1 (low-utility) 52.5% 62.5% 52.5% 27.5%
2 (interm.-utility) 52.5% 55.0% 47.5% 27.5%
3 (high-utility) 35.0% 42.5% 47.5% 35.0%
ALL 56.67% 53.33% 49.17% 30.0%
Note: 40 observations per treatment (10 subjects × 4 sessions);
120 observations over all treatments/bidder types.
Bottom right number: overall percentage of consistent subjects.
Can we detect further regularities in the bid vectors that do not fall
into the selﬁsh category? To address this question, we focus on two kinds
of other-regarding preferences (inequality aversion and eﬃciency) as well as
on preferences for abstention (from stating discriminatory preferences). Ab-
stention means that the six individual components of the bid vector have the
same value (often equal to zero). We refer to a bid vector displaying this
pattern as showing indiﬀerence.
Turning to a classiﬁcation based on other-regarding preferences, we say
that a bid vector reveals preferences for inequality aversion (IA) if it assigns
to either σ(3) or σ(4) (namely the two rankings minimizing inequality within
the group) a position higher than the position these rankings have in the bid-
der’s true preference ordering. Then, we distinguish two kinds of inequality
aversion, depending on whether the bidder with an IA vector favors his own
or the group’s interest.
• If between σ(3) and σ(4) the bidder reveals a preference for the ranking
that he truly values the most, e.g., bi(σ(3)) > bi(σ(4)) if Ui(σ(3)) >
of the submitted bid vectors can be accounted for by this simple criterion.
21
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 005Ui(σ(4)), we say that his bid vector exhibits IA plus selﬁshness (IA-
SEL).
• If between σ(3) and σ(4) the bidder reveals a preference for the more
socially eﬃcient ranking, e.g., bi(σ(3)) > bi(σ(4)) if W(σ(3)) > W(σ(4)),
we say that his bid vector exhibits IA plus eﬃciency concern (IA-EF).
Finally, we say that a bid vector reveals preferences for eﬃciency (EF)
if it assigns to σ(6) (i.e., the socially eﬃcient ranking) a position higher than
the position this ranking has in the bidder’s true preference ordering.
If a vector does not fall in any of the above classiﬁcations, it is included
in the category other.
Since the three player types diﬀer in the trade-oﬀ between selﬁshness and
other-regarding concerns, we evaluate the data separately for each type.
5.3.1 Low-utility bidders
The ranking that a low-utility bidder truly values the most is σ(3), which
coincides with one of the rankings minimizing inequality among bidders.
Hence, this type of bidder cannot assign σ(3) to a higher position than the
one it has in the true ordering. From the above deﬁnition, it follows that no
bid vector submitted by bidder 1 is classiﬁable as IA-SEL.
Figure 2 displays, for each treatment, how many observed bid vectors can
be classiﬁed as showing selﬁshness, other-regarding preferences, and indiﬀer-
ence. Unclassiﬁable vectors are into the category “other”. The classiﬁcation
of the vectors according to other-regarding preferences is reported in Table 8.
As noted above, selﬁshness (i.e., the weak ordering criterion) accommo-
dates most of the data. Yet, the fraction of bid vectors consistent with
other-regarding preferences is not negligible: it ranges from 20% in T to 30%
in B. Except for the B treatment, where the two kinds of other-regarding
preferences are equally common, in both the other treatments IA-EF slightly
outperforms EF (see Table 8).
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selfish other regarding indifferent other
Figure 2: Classiﬁcation of bid vectors submitted by the low-utility type in
each treatment.
Table 8: Classiﬁcation of the low-utility type’s bid vectors exhibiting other-
regarding preferences (numbers in parentheses refer to the entire
population of low-utility bidders).
B S T
IA-EF 50.0% (15%) 55.6% (18.52%) 75% (15%)
EF 50.0% (15%) 44.4% (14.81%) 25% (5%)
N 12 (40) 9 (40) 8 (40)
Note: N denotes the number of observations per treatment.
5.3.2 Intermediate-utility bidders
For an intermediate-utility bidder there is no trade-oﬀ between selﬁshness and
eﬃciency as his true preference ordering assigns σ(6) to the highest position.
Additionally, this type of bidder does not face any trade-oﬀ between the two
kinds of inequality aversion: both IA with a selﬁsh aspect and IA with an
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selfish other regarding indifferent other
Figure 3: Classiﬁcation of bid vectors submitted by the intermediate-utility
type in each treatment.
eﬃciency aspect require him to submit a bid vector where σ(4) occupies the
ﬁrst position in the ordering. Thus, the other-regarding bid vectors submitted
by the intermediate-utility bidders can just display inequality aversion.
The classiﬁcation of observed bid vectors is reported in Figure 3. The
frequency of vectors consistent with our deﬁnition of other-regarding pref-
erences is higher for this type than for low-utility bidders in the S and T
treatments.
5.3.3 High-utility bidders
The least favorite rankings of a high-utility bidder are exactly σ(4), σ(3), and
σ(6). Thus, diﬀerently from what pertains to the other types, for bidders 3 the
trade-oﬀ between selﬁshness and other-regarding concerns is more substan-
tial. Yet, the percentage of bid vectors classiﬁable as other-regarding is not
insigniﬁcant (see Figure 4). The bid vector of a high-utility bidder must value
σ(3) more than σ(4) to be classiﬁed as IA-SEL, and the vice versa must hold
to be classiﬁed as IA-EF. The classiﬁcation of the vectors by other-regarding
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selfish other regarding indifferent other
Figure 4: Classiﬁcation of bid vectors submitted by the high-utility type in
each treatment.
Table 9: Classiﬁcation of the high-utility type’s bid vectors exhibiting other-
regarding preferences (numbers in parentheses refer to the entire
population of high-utility bidders).
B S T
IA-SEL 8.33% (2.5%) 37.5% (7.5%) 10.0% (2.5%)
IA-EF 33.33% (10%) 25.0% (18.52%) 40.0% (15%)
EF 58.33% (17.5%) 37.5% (7.5%) 50.0% (12.5%)
N 12 (40) 8 (40) 10 (40)
Note: N denotes the number of observations per treatment.
preferences is reported in Table 9.
Considering Figure 4, we ﬁnd that selﬁsh bid vectors are observed less
often than for the other types. However, the occurrence of other-regarding
preferences is not higher than for the low-utility type. Rather, indiﬀerent
bid vectors increase in frequency. From Table 9, we see that preferences for
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most bid vectors. Jointly, these observations suggest that being the most
favored with respect to utility somehow discourages selﬁshness, and supports
indiﬀerence and concerns for social welfare.
6 Conclusions
We are used to assign monetary values to the things we want. For private
goods this happens in markets, where goods are exchanged for money. In this
paper, we suggest an extension of such money principle to settings in which
a collectivity has to agree on a common ranking of alternatives. The relative
positions of the alternatives in the ranking determines how much this ranking
is worth to each collectivity member whose preferences for the alternatives
diﬀer from those of the others in the way captured by the voting paradox.
The idea, used here, of allowing each member to place a monetary bid on
each feasible ranking represents an endogenous solution to the paradox and
is akin to the ways in which private goods are allocated by markets.
The bidding rule that we propose is derived from three axioms so as to be
procedurally fair. Procedural fairness is ensured by our basic equality axiom
requiring that the individual members of the collectivity should receive equal
net beneﬁts with respect to their bids, namely they should be treated equally
according to their bids. The other two axioms simply demand optimality with
respect to bids, and some sort of cost balancing. The latter, together with the
equality axiom, is used to derive the individual payments. One might wonder
why we deﬁne fairness in terms of bids, rather than (what is more common)
in terms of payoﬀs. The answer is twofold. First, we want fairness to be
a property of the selection mechanism (i.e., of the game form), not of the
selected ranking. Second, and related to the ﬁrst, we are interested in legal
or constitutional mechanisms, which deal with game forms (constitutions)
and deﬁne fairness by observables rather than by idiosyncratic true values.
Having a bidding rule that satisﬁes our procedural fairness requirements
is certainly important. Yet, of equal importance is to assess which outcomes
it ﬁnally induces. Exploration of this issue entails deﬁning a proper bidding
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game with a group of three individuals facing three alternatives, and thus six
possible rankings. The main aim of our experiment is to examine whether and
how, keeping the game form procedurally fair, the selected ranking and the
individuals’ stated preferences for the six rankings are aﬀected by variations
in the required individual payments.
The experimental results provide clean evidence that changing the due
payments, introducing a tax and a subsidy, does not signiﬁcantly alter the
relative frequencies of selected rankings: with both actual and simulated
data, the ranking chosen most often is the one that generates the highest
social welfare. Moreover, the treatments do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the
occurrence of overbidding, underbidding, and truthful bidding, with under-
bidding always being the most common behavior. Only the presence of a
subsidy appears to slightly raise overbidding.
Finally, we observe that submitted bid vectors are quite heterogenous.
Most of them can be classiﬁed as selﬁsh in the sense of reﬂecting, in a weakly
monotonic way, the true preference ordering of the rankings. Yet, the fraction
of bid vectors consistent with our deﬁnition of other-regarding preferences
(namely inequality aversion and eﬃciency) is not negligible. Indiﬀerent bid
vectors (in which all six individual components have the same value) are
present as well, especially for the most favored group member.
In sum, our experimental ﬁndings indicate that the axiomatically derived
and procedurally fair bidding rule is not only implementable, but also func-
tional. More research is necessary for the generalization of our ﬁndings. But
the experimental evidence garnered here suggests that the proposed bidding
rule for collectively selecting a ranking of alternatives tends to maximize
social welfare and is robust to slight changes in the required payments.
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In this appendix, we will focus on the equilibrium that implements the so-
cially eﬃcient ranking, based on truthful bidding for all other non-selected
rankings.
Denote by σef the socially eﬃcient ranking and by σsb the second most
eﬃcient ranking. Suppose that in case of equal maximal bid sums for two
or more rankings, the ranking that generates the maximum social welfare
is selected. Then the bid proﬁle in which all three players (i) strategically
underbid for σef, and (ii) bid truthfully for all rankings but σef can be an
























Ui(σ) ∀ σ 6= σ
ef, σ ∈ Σ.
We show that no bidder i = 1,2,3 has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from this bid proﬁle. If all bidders underbid for σef and bid truthfully for σsb,











If, instead, bidder i unilaterally increases his bid for σsb to Ui(σsb) + δ,









which is lower than the equilibrium payoﬀ in (A-1) due to b∗
i(σef) < Ui(σef).
On the other hand, setting bi(σsb) < Ui(σsb) does not change the outcome,
σef, and thus cannot pay.
Lowering bi(σef) below b∗
i(σef), for i = 1,2,3, so as to induce the sec-
ond most eﬃcient ranking σsb does not pay either: bidder i would earn
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j=1 Uj(σsb)
3 , which is lower than πi(b
∗) in (A-1).
Positive linear transformations of the payoﬀ function do not inﬂuence the
solution. Hence, the above outcome remains an equilibrium in a game where
K 6= 0 holds.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) that we used
for the sequence BST. The instructions for the other sequence were adapted
accordingly. We include only the instructions for part 1, which pertain to
the experiment described in this paper.
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. Please switch oﬀ your mobile(s) and remain silent.
It is strictly forbidden to talk to other participants. Please raise your hand when-
ever you have a question; one of the experimenters will come to your aid.
You will receive e5.50 for showing up on time. Besides this, you can earn
more. But there is also a small possibility of ending up with a loss that you
will compensate by using your show-up fee. The show-up fee and any additional
amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e., the others will not see your
earnings.
In the course of the experiment, we shall speak of ECUs (Experimental Cur-
rency Unit) rather than euros. The conversion rate is 100 ECUs per 1 e.
The experiment consists of two parts. The instructions for the ﬁrst part follow
below. The instructions for the second part will be distributed after all participants
have completed the ﬁrst part.
Detailed Information on Phase 1 (Part 1)
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 3 phases. You have received the instructions
for the ﬁrst phase. The instructions for the second phase will be distributed after
all participants have completed the ﬁrst phase and the instructions for the third
phase will be distributed after all participants have completed the second phase.
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of three persons. The three group members will
interact with each other just once. You will never be informed of the identity of
the two participants in your group.
Each group member will be identiﬁed by a letter: X, Y, or Z. Speciﬁcally, when
placed in a group:
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• with 1/3 probability you will be identiﬁed by the letter “Y”;
• with 1/3 probability you will be identiﬁed by the letter “Z”.
You will learn your identifying letter at the beginning of the experiment.
The situation you will face
You and the other two members of your group will face a situation involving six
possible alternatives, namely alternatives A1,A2,A3,A4,A5, and A6. The three of
you will decide which of the six alternatives will be selected. (The rules determining
which alternative will be selected are described below).
Individual gain from each alternative
The three group members X, Y, and Z have diﬀerent individual gains from the
diﬀerent alternatives. Table B-1 shows the gain of each group member from each
alternative. Consider, for example, alternative A1. If you are group member X,
you obtain 533 ECUs from A1. If you are group member Y, you obtain 333 ECUs.
If you are group member Z, you obtain 600 ECUs. More generally, if you are X, the
ﬁrst row of Table B-1 shows your gains from the various alternatives; if you are Y,
the second row of Table B-1 shows your gains from the various alternatives; if you
are Z, the third row of Table B-1 shows your gains from the various alternatives.
Please, note that the order in which the six alternatives will appear on your
screen during the experiment can be diﬀerent from that given in Table B-1.
Table B-1: Individual Gains from the Six Alternatives
Group member A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
X 533 367 633 567 300 400
Y 333 417 417 583 583 667
Z 600 700 433 367 633 467
Your screen will show you additional information on each of the six alternatives.
More speciﬁcally, you will see four additional rows:
• one row will display the “average gain” from each alternative (namely the
sum of individual gains divided by 3);
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and (in parentheses) who – among the three group members (X, Y, or Z) –
gets this minimum;
• a third row will display the maximum gain associated with each alternative
and (in parentheses) who – among the three group members (X, Y, or Z) –
gets this maximum;
• ﬁnally, a fourth row will display the sum of individual gains from each al-
ternative.
Your decision
Having learned if you are group member X, Y, or Z, you will need to place a bid
for each alternative A1,A2,A3,A4,A5, and A6, so that you will have to submit six
bids. Regardless of your individual gains from the alternatives, your bids can be
any integer number between 0 and 1000 ECUs (i.e., 0,1,2,...,998,999,1000).
Rules for the selection of an alternative
Which of the six alternatives will be selected depends on the total number of ECUs
that you and the other two members of your group bid for each alternative.
Speciﬁcally: the alternative with the highest bid sum will be selected.
If two or more alternatives tie for ﬁrst place (i.e., they receive the same highest
bid sum), the tie is broken by selecting the alternative with the highest sum of
individual gains. For example, if alternatives A1 and A4 tie, then A4 will be
selected because the sum of individual gains for A4 (567 + 583 + 367 = 1517) is
greater than that for A1 (533 + 333 + 600 = 1466).
Your experimental earnings
Your earnings depend on the selected alternative, and the bids submitted by you
and your group members for the selected alternative. Call the selected alternative
A∗. Then,
− you are paid your gain from A∗ (as reported in Table 1),
− you pay your bid for A∗,
− you receive one third of the sum of your group’s bids for A∗.
Thus, your earnings summarized in a formula are
your gain from A∗ − your bid for A∗ + one third of the bid sum for A∗
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your earnings are:
your gain from A1 − your bid for A1 + one third of the bid sum for A1
(533) − (integer within 0 to 1000) + 1/3 × (bid sum for A1)
Note that if your bid for the selected alternative exceeds your gain from that
alternative, then your earnings could be negative, i.e., you may suﬀer a loss.
The following examples should help you better understand the calculation of
your earnings. Notice that the numbers in the examples are just for illustrative
purposes. They DO NOT intend to suggest how you may choose your bids.
Example 1
Suppose that A5 is the alternative selected by your group (this means that A5
receives the highest bid sum in your group). Suppose further that the bids of each
group member for A5 are the following:
• X’s bid = 300;
• Y’s bid = 583;
• Z’s bid = 633.
Therefore each group member’s earnings are:
• X’s Earnings: 300 − 300 + 300+583+633
3 = 1516
3 = 505 ECUs.
• Y’s Earnings: 583 − 583 + 300+583+633
3 = 1516
3 = 505 ECUs.
• Z’s Earnings: 633 − 633 + 300+583+633
3 = 1516
3 = 505 ECUs.
Note that in this case each group member has submitted a bid for the selected
alternative which equals his/her own gain.
Example 2
Suppose that A1 is the alternative selected by your group. Suppose further that
the bids of each group member for A1 are the following:
• X’s bid = 233;
• Y’s bid = 0;
• Z’s bid = 550.
Therefore each group member’s earnings are:
• X’s Earnings: 533 − 233 + 233+0+550
3 = 200 + 783
3 = 461 ECUs.
• Y’s Earnings: 333 − 0 + 233+0+550
3 = 333 + 783
3 = 594 ECUs.
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3 = 50 + 783
3 = 311 ECUs.
Note that in this case each group member has submitted a bid for the selected
alternative which is lower than his/her own gain.
Example 3
Suppose that A3 is the alternative selected by your group. Suppose further that
the bids of each group member for A3 are the following:
• X’s bid = 633;
• Y’s bid = 1000;
• Z’s bid = 0.
Therefore each group member’s earnings are:
• X’s Earnings: 633 − 633 + 633+1000+0
3 = 0 + 1633
3 = 544 ECUs.
• Y’s Earnings: 417 − 1000 + 633+1000+0
3 = −583 + 1633
3 = −583 + 544 = −39
ECUs.
• Z’s Earnings: 433 − 0 + 633+1000+0
3 = 433 + 1633
3 = 433 + 544 = 977 ECUs.
In this example, group member Y suﬀers a loss because his/her bid for A3 exceeds
his/her gain from A3 plus 1/3 of the bid sum for A3 (i.e., 1000 > 417 + 544).
Timing of provided information
You will be informed about your group members’ choices in phase 1 of part 1
only after the end of the session. Thus, you will learn (a) your group members’
bids in the ﬁrst phase of part 1, (b) which alternative is selected, and (c) your
experimental earnings in this phase on completion of part 2 of the experiment.
Your ﬁnal payoﬀ
Only one of the three phases of part 1 will end up aﬀecting your ﬁnal payoﬀ, but
you do not know in advance which phase will be used. After part 2 is over, we
will randomly select one participant by drawing a card from a deck that contains
as many cards as the number of participants. This participant will in his/her turn
randomly select one of the three phases of part 1 by drawing a ball from an urn
containing three balls numbered 1 to 3. The experimental earnings corresponding
to this phase will be converted to euros and paid out in cash. The outcome of the
draw will apply to all the participants.
Since you do not know which phase will determine your payoﬀ, think carefully
when choosing your bids!
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• You will be matched with two other participants; each of you will be iden-
tiﬁed by a letter (X, Y, or Z) which is assigned randomly.
• You will face six alternatives A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 and A6.
• For each of the alternatives you will have a diﬀerent gain, as shown in Table
1.
• You will have to decide how much to bid for each alternative. Your bids
must be integers between 0 and 1000 ECUs and are submitted exactly once.
• The alternative with the highest bid sum is selected (ties are broken by
selecting the alternative with the highest sum of individual gains).
• If we call A∗ the selected alternative, your experimental earnings are:
your gain from A∗ − your bid for A∗ + one-third of the bid sum for A∗.
• You will be informed about phase 1’s results and earnings once the experi-
ment is over.
Control questions and practice rounds
Before starting you will have to answer some control questions which will ensure
your understanding of these rules. Once everybody has answered all questions cor-
rectly, four practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with the experiment.
In these rounds you will not be matched with other people in this room, but the
computer will randomly select the others’ bids. The result of these rounds will not
be relevant to your ﬁnal payoﬀ.
On the screen you will have an earnings calculator that you can use to simulate
your earnings in diﬀerent scenarios. You can start the calculator by pressing the
corresponding button on your screen. If you do so, a window will appear on
your screen. Into this window you must enter your six bids, and the six bids
that you expect from each of your group members. Given these ﬁgures, if you
press the apposite button, you will know which alternative is selected and your
corresponding earnings.
Please remain quietly seated during the whole experiment. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand now. Please click “ok” on your computer screen when
you have ﬁnished reading the instructions of this phase of the experiment.
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In this phase you will face a situation similar to that encountered in the ﬁrst phase.
As before:
• you will be matched with two other participants;
• the three group members will be identiﬁed by a letter (X, Y, or Z); your
identifying letter is the same as in phase 1 (i.e., you will be X, Y, or Z, if
you previously were, respectively, X, Y, or Z);
• you and the other two members of your group will face six alternatives;
• your individual gains from the six alternatives are those shown in phase 1’s
Table 1;
• you will submit a bid for each alternative (your bids can be any integer
number between 0 and 1000 ECUs);
• the six bids have to be submitted just once;
• the alternative with the highest bid sum will be selected;
• if two or more alternatives tie for ﬁrst place, the tie is broken by selecting
the alternative with the highest sum of individual gains.
But now
B you will be placed in a new group of three persons (i.e., the two participants
you will be matched with are diﬀerent ones);
B your experimental earnings will include an extra constant term. Speciﬁ-
cally, if A∗ is the alternative selected by your group, your earnings are:
your gain from A∗ − your bid for A∗ + 1/3 of the bid sum for A∗ + 150
That is, in this phase:
− you are paid your gain from the selected alternative A∗,
− you pay your bid for A∗,
− you receive one third of the sum of your group’s bids for A∗ plus 150.
Please note that you may once again suﬀer a loss if your bid for the selected
alternative exceeds your gain from that alternative.
The following example should help you better understand the calculation of
your earnings in this phase.
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Suppose that A1 is the alternative selected by your group (this means that A1
receives the highest bid sum in your group). Suppose further that the bids of each
group member for A1 are the following:
• X’s bid = 233;
• Y’s bid = 0;
• Z’s bid = 550.
Therefore each group member’s earnings are:
• X’s Earnings: 533 − 233 + 233+550
3 + 150 = 200 + 783
3 + 150 = 611 ECUs.
• Y’s Earnings: 333 − 0 + 233+550
3 + 150 = 333 + 783
3 + 150 = 744 ECUs.
• Z’s Earnings: 600 − 550 + 233+550
3 + 150 = 50 + 783
3 + 150 = 461 ECUs.
As with the previous phase:
• feedback on 1) your group members’ bids, 2) which alternative is selected,
and 3) your experimental earnings will be provided after the end of the
session (i.e., after part 2).
• control questions and practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with
the rules of this phase of the experiment (the structure of the practice rounds
remains the same: the computer determines randomly the other’s decisions
and the result are not relevant to your ﬁnal payoﬀ).
Please click “ok” if you have ﬁnished reading the instructions for the present phase
and have no further questions.
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The third phase of part 1 of the experiment resembles the previous two phases.
Speciﬁcally:
• you will be matched with two other participants;
• the three group members will be identiﬁed by a letter (X, Y, or Z); your
identifying letter is the same as in the previous two phases;
• you and the other two members of your group will face six alternatives;
• your individual gains from the six alternatives are those shown in phase 1’s
Table 1;
• you will submit a bid for each alternative (yours bids can be any integer
number between 0 and 1000 ECUs);
• the six bids have to be submitted just once;
• the alternative with the highest bid sum will be selected;
• if two or more alternatives tie for ﬁrst place, the tie is broken by selecting
the alternative with the highest sum of individual gains.
But now:
B you will be placed in a new group of three persons (i.e., the other two
members of your group are participants you have never before interacted
with);
B the 150 ECUs will be subtracted (rather than added) to compute your
experimental earnings. Speciﬁcally, if A∗ is the alternative selected by your
group, your earnings in this phase are:
your gain from A∗ − your bid for A∗ + 1/3 of the bid sum for A∗ − 150
That is, in this phase:
− you are paid your gain from the selected alternative A∗,
− you pay your bid for A∗,
− you receive one third of the sum of your group’s bids for A∗ minus
150.
Be aware that you may once again suﬀer a loss if your bid for the selected
alternative exceeds your gain from that alternative.
38
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 005The following example should help you better understand the calculation of
your earning in this phase.
Example
Suppose that A1 is the alternative selected by your group (this means that A1
receives the highest bid sum in your group). Suppose further that the bids of each
group member for A1 are the following:
• X’s bid = 233;
• Y’s bid = 0;
• Z’s bid = 550.
Therefore each group member’s earnings are:
• X’s Earnings: 533 − 233 + 233+550
3 − 150 = 200 + 783
3 − 150 = 311 ECUs.
• Y’s Earnings: 333 − 0 + 233+550
3 − 150 = 333 + 783
3 − 150 = 444 ECUs.
• Z’s Earnings: 600 − 550 + 233+550
3 − 150 = 50 + 783
3 − 150 = 161 ECUs.
As before:
• feedback on this phase’s bids and earnings will be provided after the end of
the session (i.e., after part 2).
• control questions and practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with
the rules of this phase of the experiment (the structure of the practice rounds
remains the same: the computer determines randomly the other’s decisions
and the result are not relevant to your ﬁnal payoﬀ).
Please click “ok” if you have ﬁnished reading the instructions for the present phase
and have no further questions.
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